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Abstract 
Medical systems are designed for a range of end users from different professional skill groups and people who carry the 
devices in and on their bodies. Open, accurate, and efficient communication is the priority for medical systems and 
consequently strong protection costs are traded against the utility benefits for open systems. In this paper we assess the 
vulnerabilities created by the professional and end user expectations, and theorise ways to mitigate wireless security 
vulnerabilities. The benefits of wireless medical services are great in terms of efficiencies, mobility, and information 
management. These benefits may be realised by treating the vulnerabilities and reducing the cost of adverse events. The 
purpose of this paper is to raise and to discuss key issues so that others may be motivated to treat the problems and to 
better optimise the trade-off for design improvement.   
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INTRODUCTION 
The deployment of wireless communications in medical healthcare environment has expanded to meet the clinical 
requirements (Nita, Creta & Hariton, 2011; Paquette, 2011; Topol, 2011). Many medical devices, such as telemetry, pulse 
oximetry monitors, electrocardiography (ECG) carts, neuro-stimulators, infusion pumps, insulin pumps, pacemakers, 
implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICD) and drug pumps, use the wireless communication technologies as these 
wireless medical devices allow the continuous monitoring of users’ health in the real-time (Ren, Pazzi & Boukerche., 
2010; Censi, Calcagnini, Matter, Triventi & Beutolini, 2010; Petkovic, 2009; Meingast, Ravsta & Sastry, 2006). Wireless 
services also allow mobility of patients, time-space flexibility for staff and automated information management. The staff-
patient relationship is made less structured and more socially integrated so that health services are seen as a natural part 
of daily life (Arney, Venkata, Sokotsky & Lee, 2011; Sagahyroon, Aloul, Al-Ali, Bahrololoum, Makhsoos, & Hussein, 
2011).  
Wireless technologies enable the electronic devices to interconnect and communicate without having the need of physical 
wired cabling by using radio frequency transmissions (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002). As a result of advancement in 
wireless technologies, the prevalent adoptions of wireless networks offer numerous benefits to users and organizations 
(Turab, Aljawarneh, & Masadeh, 2010). These deployments of wireless sensor networks (WSNs), wireless personal area 
networks (WPANs), wireless local area networks (WLANs), and wireless body area networks (WBANs) have offered a 
significant enrichment in quality of life. In the industries of healthcare, retail, education and entertainment there has been 
improvement in mobility, flexibility and productivity (Yuce & Khan, 2012; Darwish & Hassanien, 2011; Turab et al., 
2010). However, the nature of wireless networks also exposes the risks that may harm the users and reduce the potential 
benefits (Ngobeni, Venter & Burke, 2010; Radcliffe, 2011). The nature of wireless networking has inherited security and 
privacy problems (Halperin, 2008). In addition, the healthcare environment has requirements of open communication 
between professionals and patients who are often mobile between diverse geographic locations. Systems are not unified 
or standardised. Some common standards may be adopted but the variability in capability, proprietary hardware, and 
software, and policies make seamless services difficult. Even with these challenges, the deployment of wireless 
technologies in the medical healthcare has delivered benefits (Hanna, Rolles, Molina, Poosankam, Fu & Song, 2011; 
Devaraj & Ezra, 2011; Censi, Calcagnini, Mattei, Triventi & Bartolini, 2010). Our concern in this paper is the securing 
of these services in such a way that the potential for harm is minimised while the opportunity for patient benefits are 
maximised.  
BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
Security is an essential component of any IT system, either wired or wireless. The main difference between wired and 
wireless networks is the vulnerability at the physical layer (Cypher, Chevrollier, Montavont & Golmie, 2010). The 
wireless data transmitted in the wireless network is easily captured or eavesdropped by passive or active attackers. 
Consequently, built-in wireless security architectures, such as the IEEE 802.11 WLAN standards, and encryption 
protocols such as the WEP, WPA, RSN and WPA2 are required to protect and maximise the benefits from wireless 
networks (Karygiannis & Owens, 2002; Scarfone, 2008; Bulbul 2008). The security goals for wireless networks are the 
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	fundamental four of confidentiality, integrity, availability and authentication of users (Al & Yoshigoe, 2011). The 
vulnerabilities of wireless networks present risks for the use in any environment. Table 1 summaries the types of risks as 
threats a wireless network has on account of its hardware, software and configurations (adapted from Diksha & Shubham, 
2006, pp. 2-3; Frankel, Eydt, Owens & Scarfone, 2007, p. 28). The identification of the risks allows management planning 
to assure the system benefits are greater than the costs, and in a medical system, all risk of potential impact on services is 
mitigated. In this way, adverse impacts on humans are treated and patient safety assured.  
 
Table 1. Types of major threats against wireless networks and devices  
(adapted from Diksha & Shubham, 2006, pp. 2-3; Frankel et al., 2007, p. 28) 
Threat Type Description 
Ad hoc or Peer-to-Peer 
Connection 
Attacker can exploit a wireless client or device after establishing ad hoc connection 
(unauthorised client attempt to form ad hoc network with legitimate client). After 
establishing the ad hoc connection, the attacker can perform port scanning to explore and 
exploit client vulnerabilities 
Client Mis-association Attacker can compromise a corporate wireless client after the client within business 
premises mis-associates or connects to an unauthorised external Wi-Fi network (which is 
set up by an attacker by using a rogue AP). 
Denial of Service 
(Dos) 
Attacker prevents or prohibits the normal use or management of networks or network 
devices. 
Eavesdropping Attacker passively monitors network communications for data, including authentication 
credentials. 
Evil Twin/Honeypot 
AP 
Attacker sets up Honeypot AP with a default service set identifier (SSID, network name) 
hotspot SSID, or corporate SSID and observes many wireless clients connect to it and can 
then be initiate attacks on connected clients (e.g. stealing passwords by presenting a fake 
Facebook login page to clients over the mis-associated wireless connection. 
Man-in-the-Middle Attacker actively intercepts the path of communications between two legitimate parties, 
thereby obtaining authentication credentials and data. Attacker can then masquerade as a 
legitimate party. In the context of a WLAN, a man-in-the-middle attack can be achieved 
through a bogus or rogue AP, which looks like an authorised AP to legitimate parties. 
Masquerading  Attacker impersonates an authorised user and gains certain authorised privileges. 
Message Modification Attacker alters a legitimate message by deleting, adding to, changing or recording it. 
Message Replay Attacker passively monitors transmissions and retransmits messages, acting as if the 
attacker were a legitimate user. 
Mis-configured AP Attacker can take advantage of a potential security hole (open door) created by a mis-
configured AP to launch an attack on the corporate network. 
Rouge AP  Attacker can either plugged an unauthorised AP into the corporate network or use a 
computer (e.g. laptop) running software fake AP to provide wireless access to Wi-Fi clients 
within the range. 
Rogue Clients Attacker actively access an authorised cooperate wireless network via mis-configured AP 
(e.g. encryption turned off) or through an AP after compromising 
encryption/authentication.  
Traffic Analysis Attacker passively monitors transmissions to identify communication patterns and 
participants. 
The applications of wireless technologies are found in many medical devices. The wireless communication system allows 
two way communication, information exchange and control of many different events. The wireless capability applies to 
both sensor and actuator systems and hence the range of risks is wide. In Table 2 a summary is made of potential adverse 
events that may occur if a wireless application fails to perform as intended (Hansen & Hansen, 2010, p. 15). In Table 3 a 
summary of potential threats against wireless systems is made, the related security requirement defined and possible 
security solutions specified (Ng, Sim & Tan, 2006, p. 141). The best-case scenario is that all possible security threats can 
be treated and will not materialise in a wireless medical network. The weaker case is that the possibility of adverse 
occurrences is reduced to a minor probability by mitigation of the causal factors. The residual risk in this instance should 
be such that the unintended variation can be managed within normal medical procedures and practices in such a way that 
the end user of the services has no negative consequences. With careful preparation and adequate protective measures 
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	wireless networks and wireless medical devices can deliver a better life experience and health opportunity. Our research 
highlights the trade-offs required for secure systems. A full assessment of the costs and benefits can reduce the potential 
of harm to an unremarkable amount that has no material impact on safety. However, reaching a point where a medical 
system is sufficiently robust and does not deliver adverse events requires comprehensive consideration of all probable 
controls. In the next section, we shall discuss the role of standards and standardisation in securing wireless medical 
systems. 
 
Table 2. Potential adverse events in various implantable medical devices (Hansen & Hansen, 2010, p. 15) 
Device Adverse Events 
Pacemaker, Implanted Cardiac Defibrillator (Mirowski et 
al., 1970); Ventricular Assist Device (Glenville & Ross, 
1986) 
Heart failure, Tachycardia, Bradycardia, Arrhythmia 
Cochlear Implant Deafness, Phantom sounds, Distraction/Confusion 
Prosthetic Limb Control System (Velliste et al., 2008) Injury, Damage to prosthetic limb, Inadvertent 
movement 
Spinal Cord Simulator (Brindley et al., 1982) Loss of pain relief, Inappropriate stimulation 
Sacral Anterior Root Simulator (Brindley et al., 1982) Infection from inability to void, Inappropriate 
stimulation 
Retinal Prosthesis (Chow et al., 2004), Implanted Contact 
Lens, Intraocular Lens 
Blindness, Phantom images, Distraction/Confusion 
Implanted Infusion Pump Inappropriate dosage/timing 
Brain-Machine Interface and Other Neuroprosthesis 
(Santhanam et al., 2006; Song et al., 2009) 
Loss of consciousness, Neural effects (Denning et al., 
2009) 
Responsive Neurostimulator and Other Deep Brain 
Simulator (Sun et al., 2008) 
Inappropriate stimulation, Failure to stimulate 
Implanted Monitor or Sensor Incorrect readings 
Implanted RFID Tag (Halamka et al., 2006) Loss of privacy, Data leakage 
Implanted Dynamic LED Tatto Inappropriate display 
Standards provide the opportunity for interoperability between medical systems and interoperability between the different 
medical devices. However, there is one substantial limitation with regard to the applications of wireless technologies in 
healthcare systems. The problem is the "the lack of interoperability among devices belonging to different vendors, even 
if they physically use the same wireless technology" (Delmastro, 2012, p. 1292). There is also a need for common data 
formats and transmission frequencies.  
 
Table 3. Wireless sensor networks security threats, security requirements and possible solutions  
(Ng et al., 2006, p. 141) 
Security Threats Security Requirements Possible Security Solutions 
Unauthenticated or 
unauthorised access 
Key establishment and trust setup  Random key distribution 
 Public key cryptography 
Message disclosure Confidentiality and privacy  Link/network layer encryption 
 Access control 
Message modification Integrity and authenticity  Keyed secure hash function 
 Digital signature 
Denial-of-service (DoS) Availability  Intrusion detection 
 Redundancy 
Node capture and 
compromised node 
Resilience to node compromise  Inconsistency detection and node 
revocation 
 Tamper-proofing 
Routing attacks Secure routing  Secure routing protocols 
Intrusion and high-level 
security attacks 
Secure group management, intrusion 
detection, secure data aggregation 
 Secure group communication 
 Intrusion detection 
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	There are numerous guidelines and standards related to medical healthcare technology. These guidelines and standards 
are created and embraced by international organizations, government agencies and professional or specialised 
organizations and societies (David & Judd, 2006). There are more than “20,000 individual standards and guidelines 
produced by 600 organizations and agencies from North America alone” (David & Judd, 2006, p. 75-14). Some of the 
standards address design and manufacturing practices for medical devices and related software although others apply to 
the safety and performance requirements for particular technologies (for instance, electrical and radiation safety 
standards). Likewise, standards are also required for the “coding and structure of clinical patient care data; the content of 
data sets for specific purposes; and electronic transmission of such data to integrate data efficiently across departmental 
systems within a hospital and data from the systems of other hospitals and healthcare providers” (Fitzmaurice, 2006, p. 
41-42).  
 
Table 4. Summarised top ten medical device challenges and possible solutions  
Challenge Possible Solution/Best Practice 
1. Interfacing between devices 
and information systems 
Provide appropriate education and training to users or technicians. 
2. Maintaining computerized 
equipment and systems 
Medical device manufacturers should validate their equipment with the most 
popular anti-virus and should provide clear instructions on how to install anti-
virus program on particular devices.  
3. Managing alarms Clinical staff should be given education and training about the alarm setup, 
default settings and proper use of alarms in order to avoid the life and death 
of patients when alarms could not either be heard or ignored. 
4. Maintaining and processing 
endoscopes 
Users should be given proper education and training on how to clean, sterilize 
and maintain endoscopes as such devices are very sensitive and can be 
broken easily.  
5. Broken connectors Virtually all medical devices have some sort of connector and they can be 
difficult to replace. Furthermore, broken connectors are the most common 
cause of no problems founds (NPFs) when a clinician raises a concern about 
a device and then a technician checks it out. To prevent the issues related to 
broken connectors, setting a timer in connectors to remind if replacements 
are needed after a number of predefined connections has been reached. 
6. Wireless management The demand in wireless enabled medical devices for flexibility is raising one 
of the challenges in hospital/healthcare industry. Proper education and 
training should be given to users and IT personnel in order to maintain the 
devices. 
7. Battery management Healthcare facilities and patients/users of the medical devices should have 
efficient battery maintenance and replacement in their budgets as part of the 
preventive maintenance (PM) program. It is important to give proper training 
users and patients/users of the medical devices. Likewise, additional 
replacement battery packs and chargers should be given to mobile users of 
physiological monitors and defibrillators as batteries can easily be failed due 
to no power outlets available. 
8. Problems with patient monitors 
(in-hospitals or at home, at 
work and around the 
community)  
Users have to work with appropriate stakeholders, IT and clinicians to 
establish a risk management process that identifies vulnerabilities associated 
with patient monitoring systems and devices in order to mitigate all 
substantial risks. 
9. Problems with dialysis 
equipment 
It is essential to review the service schedule with clinicians and nurse 
managers responsible for dialysis service in advance of scheduled 
maintenance.    
10. Managing the radiation dose 
from Computed Tomography 
(CT) 
Radiation overdose and other dose errors is a top health technology hazard 
as a result of human error (wrongly administered radiation) or software-
related errors.   Users have to work with appropriate stakeholders, IT and 
clinicians to keep up the performance of such therapy systems and devices 
by regular maintenance. 
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	The International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) and others are formulating standards for the safety of wireless 
medical systems. For example, specific standards include: 
 Digital Imaging and Communications (DICOM)  
 Health Level Seven International (HL7)  
 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA)  
 European Union Data Protection Directive (1998)  
 Medical Data Interchange (MEDIX) Standard  
 IEEE P1073 Medical Information Bus (MIB)  
 International Standard Organization/Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (ISO/IEEE 11073 or X73), 
Personal Health Data (PHD). 
The establishment of a robust system also requires control of many minor matters that are best associated with 
management policies, processes, procedures, and audit controls. Wireless connections now permeate all medical systems 
and devices and much risk can be treated by general management systems. In Table 4 the top ten challenges associated 
with managing medical devices are listed and risk mitigation strategies listed (Loughlin & Williams, 2011, pp. 99-103).  
DISCUSSION 
Wireless medical systems and devices offer measureable advantages for the delivery of medical services and end user 
flexibility. The vulnerability of wireless systems to attack, to mistakes and to technical problems has been reviewed in 
the background literature and requires risk management in order to maintain a safe environment. The degree to which 
vulnerabilities can escalate into serious events is amplified by the sensitivity of medical services. Events have implications 
for life quality, privacy and work effectiveness. Consequently, any residual risk has to be treated within the professional 
actions of a normal days work. However, published reports reviewed above related to the deployment of wireless 
communications and wireless medical devices in the healthcare industry show there have been a number of issues, events 
and challenges that have reduced the potential benefits. Prudent risk management has the ability to assure fewer adverse 
events and greater benefits. The numerous issues reviewed involved a lack of comprehensive coverage of wireless and 
mobile networks, reliability of wireless infrastructure, general limitations of handheld devices, medical usability of 
sensors and mobile devices, interference with other medical devices, privacy and security, misuse and malicious activities. 
The issues and challenges that require solution for effective service delivery can be grouped into five key areas; resources, 
electromagnetic spectrum, malicious attacks, standards and privacy.  
Generally, wireless medical devices have limited resources (e.g. computational power, memory, and battery power). The 
resource constrains is one of the factors that can lead to compromised security and privacy of patients or device users. 
This also applies to the size of cryptographic algorithms that can be used. Similarly, the use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum for wireless communication introduces a capacity that is less than most wired networks. The nature of wireless 
devices allows the users of those devices to go anywhere at any time. As a result, there exists a potential issue related to 
the Electromagnetic Interference (EMI) among wireless medical devices employing the same ISM frequency band of 
2.4GHz. For example, a Bluetooth enabled device can cause delay in transferring patient data and a packet loss up to 60% 
in a WPAN Electrocardiogram (ECG) monitor at very close range. When collaborative and non-collaborative actions are 
applied to mitigate the interference issues caused by the coexistence of WLAN and Bluetooth enabled devices the problem 
with interference is still unavoidable. Thus, there is a need for a strict monitoring and control of the spectrum usage in 
order to detect usage constantly, and to direct the choice of which technology to use. A similar service problem arises in 
many hospital buildings where heavy concrete structures and other obstacles can attenuate signals preventing the full use 
of bandwidth and EM resources. 
The risk in medical systems of privacy breeches and inappropriate use of resources is high. A smaller but related risk is 
that of people hacking into the systems to achieve similar ends and impacts of an equal significance. Disruption to any 
medical service impacts patient health and life opportunities; whether it causes delays, extra costs, and inappropriate 
disclosures or affects the correct delivery of fluids or other services. In Table 1 the major threats to types of wireless 
networks and devices are summarised. In Table 2 the potential adverse events that may occur in some of the wireless 
enabled medical devices are also listed. These risks and consequences suggest that securing wireless networks and devices 
is crucial to patient safety at both a technical and managerial level. The security trade-off of these medical systems is the 
benefit of mobility and access. The medical services require protection from internal and external attacks while 
maintaining the best possible benefits for the patient and professionals from the technology. Insider attacks come from 
staff that may unintentionally or intentionally cause errors, loss of availability and integrity, financial loss and disclosure 
of sensitive information or the loss of physical assets. These risks may be mitigated by policies and managerial controls 
but they are difficult to eliminate. Table 4 summarises the top ten solutions for wireless medical device risk treatment.  
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	The social and dynamic nature of human interaction introduces risk that cannot be zeroed without eliminating the very 
nature of the service being provided. External attacks are easier to defend against because standard IT protection 
mechanisms such as the firewalls or intrusion prevention systems and defence strategies can be applied to protect IT 
systems. Similarly, physical access to a hospital or healthcare organization can be controlled and unwanted access 
prevented. Again, the biggest threat is if social engineering techniques are applied and a malicious agent from outside of 
the system impersonates or seizes the identity of a beneficial agent then the system security is compromised. The context 
is the cost-benefit trade-off that reduces the effectiveness of perfect security solutions in proportion to user expectations. 
In a socially dynamic and socially engaged professional and community-based service, health has to engage and interface 
with many uncontrolled and deliberately uncontrollable variables. For example, a patient expects to be mobile and perhaps 
travel internationally when they have a pacemaker fitted to their heart. The health professionals in any country expect to 
have access to the pacemaker to provide the health services, when it is required. The risk is that with such open and 
potentially hopeful arrangements that the protective systems are not as secure as the current state of security knowledge 
for mobile devices allows. Few international standards cover interoperability and security of technologies in such 
circumstances. The problem then remains of accepting best intentions when mistakes and malicious activity may occur.  
Standardisation has the greatest potential to treat security risks for wireless devices in health systems. Table 3 also adds 
techniques for mitigating threats and providing appropriate solutions. Managing security risks for wireless medical 
devices is an underdeveloped research area that requires further theorising. The issues arise because the solutions for best 
IT security may not appropriately fit the health services environment. The nature of health services requires high integrity 
in not only biological areas but also IT technical areas. The non-human IT objects interface and interact with humans and 
consequently require diverse responses to complex and high-risk human life situations. The health environment is 
constantly evolving to meet the requirements of services and the growing expectations of patients and professional staff. 
The performance of a doctor-nurse communication system, for example, has evolved from a simple telephone system, to 
text-based pagers and now into smart phone technologies. Along with the IT capability evolution so has the user 
expectations for performance, capability and effectiveness for health services evolved. The security of wireless medical 
devices is to go through similar transformations from the current situation and towards a better fit of protection and usage. 
Currently the ease of use for all stakeholders is traded against the perception of secure services and patient safety. Adverse 
events and growing user expectations will demand greater service integrity and benefits realisation.     
CONCLUSION 
The research and analysis suggest that the debate of securing wireless medical systems is not yet over. The literature 
shows that wireless systems are more vulnerable than wired systems to unplanned events and several key issues need to 
be solved. In the medical systems environment, medical devices and the service infrastructures require a minimal residual 
risk for potential disruption to the medical services. Managing the security risks is crucial to patient safety and system 
integrity. We are suggesting recognition of the requirements of socially engaged services in a medical environment and 
the subsequent cost of not being able to implement perfect IT security solutions, which leaves open the door for further 
research and IT security services development. 
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